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CONFLICT OF LAWS
HAS THE CONFLICT OF LAWS BECOME A BRANCH
OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW?
By G. W. C. Ross*
A s a point of approach to the problem stated in the title the
more specific question may be posited: Might the Wisconsin
decision in the case of Fox v. Postal Telegraph Co.,1 have been
reversed if it had been taken to the United States Supreme Court?
Over the wires of a New York corporation a telegram was sent
from New York City to Chicago, unrepeated and subject to stipu-
lation that for delay in delivery the company should be liable only
to refund the price, of the message (forty cents).. Delivery was
delayed, and repudiating the stipulation, the sender sued the com-
pany for substantial damages in a Wisconsin court. Judgment
for the plaintiff was affirmed by the Wisconsin supreme court on
the ground that though the stipulation might be valid and a good
defense by the law of both New York and Illinois, it was odious
to the public policy of Wisconsin and unenforcible in Wisconsin
courts.
This would seem an extreme case, to bring to sharp focus the
questions it is desired here to discuss. The law of Wisconsin was
pertinent only as lex fori, not as lex loci contractus in any possi-
ble meaning of that term. The contract was made in New York,
performable there and in Illinois.2 Defendant was a New York
corporation and the report does not show that either the sender
or the addressee was a resident of Wisconsin or that the message
concerned any property located or affairs pending in Wisconsin;
and the wires that carried it did not at any point between its ter-
minals run within Wisconsin. Yet in disregard of both New York
and Illinois law, the law of Wisconsin 3 was rigorously applied to
control the result. The Wisconsin supreme court discussed the
*Professor of Law, St Thomas College, St. Paul, Minn.
1(1909) 138 Wis. 648, 120 N. W. 399.
20r, if the basis of liability could be deemed non-contractual, or
to contain non-contractual elements, it remains true that the whole
transaction and relationship of the parties, on which liability could be
based, began in New York and came to an end in Illinois and never
touched Wisconsin. Cf. note 94, post.
3Meaning, of course, the purely domestic law of Wisconsin, i. e.,
the rule that would have been applied to a purely Wisconsin telegram.
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case as an application of the doctrine that the forum may refuse
to enforce a contract contrary to its public policy, no matter how
valid it may be by the lex loci contractus. But that is not what the
court really did. What it really did was to enforce a contract
that was never made and adjudge a liability that was not imposed
by the law of any place that had any connection with any of the
operative facts. A state4 may refuse in its courts to enforce rights
(contractual or non-contractual) that would arise by applying a
foreign rule of law to the events that happened, even though they
all happened within the territory of that foreign law and were
brought to pass by parties personally bound in allegiance to it.5
It has been said, that no American court would ever give judg-
ment against a prostitute's customer for the wages of her trade,
even though she had earned the wages in some "heathen" country
where her trade perchance was lawful and its wages recoverable
in court., But judgment on such a doctrine is for the defendant
and it would seem proper (at least in other states) to regard it
as not on the merits, but rather as in the nature of a non-suit,
leaving the plaintiff free to pursue the defendant again in any
jurisdiction that may entertain the action and be willing to enforce
the claim.7 But this Wisconsin judgment was not a non-suit. It
was not a judgment for defendant at all; it was for the plaintiff,--
necessarily res judicata, making impossible the future application
4Meaning by "state," one of the United States of America. For a
state' ifi the fully sovereign, international sense, the word "country"
will be used in this article.5Unless the right in question is based on a judgment rendered in
another state, Fauntleroy v. Lum, (1908) 210 U. S. 230, 28 Sup. Ct. 641,
52 L. Ed. 1039; Roche v. McDonald, (1927) 275 U. S. 449, 48 Sup. Ct.
142, 72 L. Ed. 365, or, perhaps, on a statute of another state, Lang-
maid, The Full Faith and Credit Required for Public Acts, (1929) 24
Ill. L. Rev. 383; Dodd, Power of the Supreme Court to Review State
Decisions in the Field of Conflicts, (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 533, 540
et seq.; Cook, Powers of Congress under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, (1919) 28 Yale L. J. 421, 432 et seq. Cf. note (1917) 26 Yale
L. J. 405, 410-11; Beach, Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested
Rights; (1918) 27 Yale L.-J. 656, 662 et seq.; Field, Judicial Notice of
Public Acts under the Full Faith and Credit :Clause, (1928) 12 MiNsE.-
soTA LAw REvmw 439. Yet even the valid judgment of another
state may apparently be refused enforcement by the forum if founded
on a "penal" obligation, Huntington v. Attrill, (1892) 146 U. S. 657, 13
Sup. Ct. 224, 36 L. Ed. 1123. Cf. Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 11-17.
Cf. note 47 post.6Cf. Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 216.7Cf. Langmaid, The Full Faith and Credit Required for Public
Acts, (1929) 24 Ill. L. Rev. 383, 418-19, footnote 124.
8Roche v. McDonald, (1927) 275 U. S. 449, 48 Sup. Ct. 142, 72 L.
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by another jurisdiction of the law of New York or Illinois to the
transaction. That is not refusing to enforce foreign-created rights.
It is enforcing,-with a vengeance--rights that had not been paid
for nor created by any law with any bearing upon any of the facts
on which the litigation was predicated, nor by any law to which
any of the parties concerned in those facts was (so far as ap-
pears) personally bound.0 The difference is conspicuous and has
been repeatedly pointed out.'0 In his much-criticized opinion in the
case of Union Trust Co. v. Grosman" Mr. Justice Holmes does
not hold the Illinois contract invalid, though he evidently thinks
it might well be so held. But what he holds is that however valid
as an Illinois contract, Texas courts will not enforce it against
a Texas married woman. The Georgia court has refused to en-
force an admittedly valid Missouri contract against a Missouri
married woman; i. e., refused to subject her Georgia property to
its satisfaction.' 2 These are genuine instances of refusal by the
forum to enforce foreign-created rights. 3
Ed. 365; Christmas v. Russell, (1866) 5 Wall. (U.S.) 290, 18 L. Ed.
475.
oThe case of The Kensington, (1902) 183 U. S. 263, 22 Sup. Ct.
102, 46 L. Ed. 190, is cited as a direct precedent for the Wisconsin'
decision. The court's reasoning is similar; but in the Kensington Case
the loss happened to an American citizen on an American ship bound
for an American port. Hence that decision might be rested on other
grounds, and Mr. Justice White carefully guards the language of his
opinion from intimating that the result would have been the same had
plaintiff been an Englishman suing for loss sustained on an English
ship en route from London to Hull.
loCf. Oceanic Co. v. Mellor, (1914) 233 U. S. 718, 732-33, 34 Sup.
Ct. 754, 58 L. Ed. 1171; Slater v. Mexican Ry., (1904) 194 U. S. 120,
126-129, 24 Sup. Ct. 581, 48 L. Ed. 900; Spokane R. R. Co. v. Whitley,
(1915) 237 U. S. 487, 494-5, 35 Sup. Ct. 655, 59 L. Ed. 1060; Cuba R.
R. Co. v. Crosby, (1912) 222 U. S. 473, 478-9, 32 Sup. Ct. 132, 56 L. Ed.
274; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brown, (1914) 234 U. S. 542,
547, 34 Sup. Ct. 955, 58 L. Ed. 1457; Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, (1930)
281 U. S. 397, 50 Sup. Ct. 338, 341-2, 74 L. Ed. 296; Mod. Woodmen
v. Mixer, (1924) 267 U. S. 544, 551, 45 Sup. Ct. 389, 69 L. Ed. 783. Cf.
note 67 post.
11(1917) 245 U. S. 412, 38 Sup. Ct. 147, 62 L. Ed. 368.
"2Ulman & Co. v. Magill, (1923) 155 Ga. 555, 117 S. E. 657.
"3The whole conception expressed by the phrase, "refusal to en-
force foreign-created rights" is vigorously criticized. Cf. Yntema, Horn-
book Method and Conflicts, (1928) 37 Yale L. J. 468; Cook, Recogni-
tion of "Massachusetts Rights" by New York Courts, (1918) 28 Yale
L. J. 67; Dodd, The Power of the Supreme Court to Review State
Decisions in the Field of Conflict of Laws, (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rey.
533. No doubt the expression involves an ellipsis, and perhaps an hypo-
stasis. Yet to the present writer the dispute seems largely a logomachy;
cf. note 18, post. In any case the locutions here used- conform to the
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In his pioneer development of the subject in this country Judge
Story wrote that a forum applies foreign law to a state of facts
only by "comity."'" This has been widely .taken to mean that for
the purpose of granting as well as denying recovery a forum may
treat operative facts that occurred abroad to and by procurement
of foreigners just as though they had occurred at home to and by
the acts of its own domiciled citizens. Professor Dicey says:
"The English courts might . .. decide every matter, ...
whatever the cause of action and wherever it arose, solely with
reference to the local law of England, and hence determine the
effect of things done in Scotland or in France, exactly as they
would do if the transactions had taken place between Englishmen
in England."' 5
Professor Cook revises this into the bolder proposition that
a forum "may attach any legal consequences whatever to any state
of facts whatever, including acts done in other countries, even by
persons not citizens or residents of" [the forum] .16  Certainly
the decision of a court of last resort is not reversible by any other
legal authority.' 7 If the sender of the message in the Fox Case
had sued in a British court instead of in Wisconsin and the House
of Lords had affirmed a judgment treating the message just as
though it had been sent by an Englishman in London to an Eng-
lishman in Liverpool over English-owned wires, of course the
decision would have stood. Or, to take Professor Cook literally,
if the House of Lords had chosen to treat the New York-Illinois
telegram just as the French courts would treat a message sent by
a Frenchman at Paris to a Frenchman at Lyons, that decision
would have stood too,--in England. That is rather a statement
of arbitrary power than of any civilized law.' s But Professor
Dicey's statement lays down in the terms of a general proposition
exactly what the Wisconsin court actually did in the Fox Case.
It treated that New York-Illinois message precisely as though
it had beefi sent by one Wisconsin citizen at Milwaukee to another
Wisconsin citizen at Madison over the wires of a Wisconsin com-
diction and apparent mental attitude of the United States Supreme
Court; cf. notes 10, ante and 94, post.
'
4Story, Conflict of Laws, 8th ed., ch. 2.
I5Dicey, Conflict of Laws, 3rd ed., p. 9..
6 Cook, Recognition of "Massachusetts Rights" by New York
Courts, (1918) 28 Yale L. J. 67, 69.
17 Except by the forum's own legislature, if not restrained by any
'bill of rights" constitutional provisions.
l8Cf. note 13, ante.
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pany. But Professor Dicey makes his statement only to point out
its enormity.19 And is an American state supreme court today
in the position of the House of Lords in this regard? Is it con-
stitutionally free to ignore the whole personal and geographic
incidence of the operative facts?
The burden is on those who assert the constitutional limita-
tion to find it in some definite provision of the United States con-
stitution. Discussion seems generally to come down to the "full
faith and credit" clause20 and the "due process" clause of the four-
teenth amendment.2 In the case of Western Union Telegraph Co.
v. Brown 2 the United States Supreme Court disabled South Caro-
lina from applying its own law to a telegram sent from South
Carolina to the District of Columbia and cited (inter alia) the
"interstate commerce" clause of the constitution.22  But that
seems aside from our problem. When on that ground a state is
held incompetent to apply the law of its own legislature and do-
mestic decisions to an interstate commerce transaction, it is not
because the law of some other state is applicable, but because
the law of no state is applicable; regulation of interstate com-
merce being committed by the constitution to the federal govern-
ment. The Fox telegram was an interstate commerce transac-
tion; but no federal law controlling it came into view, and it is
not perceived what light the interstate commerce clause can shed
upon the Wisconsin court's duty or liberty to apply New York
law, or Illinois or Wisconsin law, to that situation.
24
But the other two clauses of the constitution may be controll-
1ODicey, Conflict of Laws, 3rd ed., pp. 10-11.
2 0Art. IV, sec. 1.2 1Art. XIV, sec. 1.
22(1914) 234 U. S. 542, 34 Sup. Ct. 955, 58 L. Ed. 1457.
23Art. I, sec. 8 (3).
24Some cases suggest consideration also of the "impairment of
contracts" clause of the constitution, art. I, sec. 10 (1). But since
this clause applies only when state legislation has been enacted since
the contract involved was made, New Orleans Co. v. Louisiana Co.,
(1888) 125 U. S. 18, 8 Sup. Ct. 741, 31 L. Ed. 607, it seems aside from
the precise problem posited by the Fox Case. And the court seems
never to have based a decision pertinent to this problem upon that
clause; though it might be material in certain related situations. Cf.
N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Head, (1914) 234 U. S. 149, 157, 34 Sup. Ct.
879, 58 L. Ed. 1259; Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, (1930) 281 U. S. 397, 50
Sup. Ct. 338, 340, 342-43, 74 L., Ed. 296. No doubt lawyers' ingenuity
can plausibly suggest the relevance of still other constitutional pro-
visions; but as yet, all such suggestions seem to rest in purely aca-
demic speculation.
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ing. 25 Professor Schofield has urged that the due process clause
ought to protect against all error in state decisions, not only in
the field of conflicts but in any sort of case, on purely domestic
facts, so that any erroneous state decision would be reversible by
the United States Supreme Court.26 It would probably be fortu-
nate if the court would adopt Professor Schofield's position. The
Australians in their national constitution adopted,-contrary to
Canada and South Africa2 7---the American principle of federal-
ism, to-wit: that the individual states should be the governments
of general, reserved powers and the national government a gov-
ermnent of defined, delegated powers.28 But the Australians made
their national high court a court of general appeal from the state
courts, in all cases and all fields.2 This no doubt they did advis-
edly, on careful consideration of the working of the American
judicial system,30 and very likely they did wisely. Our system of
co-ordinate and (to a large extent) mutually independent state
and federal courts has come to be a thing "fearfully and wonder-
fully made," of a complex technicality rivaling the most myster-
ious intricacies of common law special pleading in its hey-day.
Only by adopting the Australian system could the "uniform laws"
that are coming to cover more and more fields of the law be kept
really uniform. More than a scintilla of suspicion may be enter-
tained that it is only so that the thorough, carefully considered
25Cf. The Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses as
Applied to the Conflict of Laws, (1917) 26 Yale L. J. 405; Dodd, The
Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in the Field
of Conflict of Laws, (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 533; Cook, The Powers
of Congress under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, (1919) 28 Yale
L. J. 421; Beach, Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights,
(1918) 27 Yale L. J. 656; Field, Judicial Notice of Public Acts under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, (1928) 12 MIN1ESOTA LAW REVIEW
439; Langmaid, The Full Faith and Credit Required for Public Acts,
(1929) 24 Ill. L. Rev. 383.26Schofield, The Supreme Court of the United States and the En-
forcement of State Law by the State Courts, (1908 3 Ill. L. Rev. 195.
27Cf. British North America Act of 1867, sec. 91; So. Africa Act
of 1909, secs. 50, 85, 86.2SCommonwealth of Australia Act 1901, sec. 107. Cf. sec. 1, and
the opening language of sec. 51, with the U. S. const., art. I, sec. 1 and
the opening words of see. 8.29Commonwealth of Australia Act 1901, sec. 73.30The Australian judicial system does not impair the proper legis-
lative autonomy of their individual states, but it does make possible a
uniform "common law of Australia," as there is not a "common law of
the United States"; cf. Smith v. Alabama, (1887) 124 U. S. 465, 477-78,
8 Sup. Ct. 564, 31 L. Ed. 508; Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprud-
ence 416-17.
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work of the American Law Institute in restating American law
as a single, comprehensive body of rules, could ever achieve a
result adequate to its enormous labor and expense.31 But notwith-
standing Professor Schofield's persuasive argument, it may be
doubted whether the Australian system will ever be put into ef-
fect in this country without a direct constitutional amendment. 32
But does not that foreclose this whole investigation? If the
doctrines of conflicts are simply part of the local law of each
state within and for itself,33 then are not state decisions in the
field of conflicts as little reviewable by the United States Supreme
Court as any others? That Court has so stated at least once. By
written contract made either in Minnesota or North Dakota a
Minilesota vendor agreed to convey Colorado land to a North
Dakota purchaser, the payments to be made and (presumably)
the deed delivered in Minnesota. The Minnesota supreme court
determined the rights and obligations of the parties under that
contract by the law of Minnesota and not by the law of Colorado
or North Dakota, 4 and its decision was affirmed by the United
States Supreme Court.35 But the opinion does not make it en-
tirely clear whether Minnesota was held simply free to apply its
own law or whether Minnesota law was held the only properly
applicable law, which the Minnesota court and all other state
courts would be constitutionally bound to apply to that contract.
The latter interpretation of the decision was urged by appellant
in the later case of Kryger v. Wilson. 6 By contract made and
performable in Minnesota a Minnesota vendor agreed to convey
North Dakota land. In the ensuing litigation the North Dakota
supreme court controlled the rights of the parties by the (domes-
tic) law of North Dakota."7 In the United States Supreme Court
the purchaser insisted that that court had already held Minnesota
3lCf., however, Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Conflict
of Laws, (1928) 37 Yale L. J. 468; Langmaid, The Full Faith and
Credit Required for Public Acts, (1929) 24 Ill. L. Rev. 383, 419-20.3-Cf note (1917) 26 Yale L. J. 405, 407-08; and, in addition to the
cases considered by Professor Schofield, Frank v. Magnum, (1915) 237
U. S. 309, 35 Sup. Ct. 582, 59 L. Ed. 969; Moore v. Dempsey, (1922)
261 U. S. 86, 43 Sup. Ct. 265, 67 L. Ed. 543.
33Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 9-10. Cf. Beale, What Law Governs
the Validity of Contracts, (1909) 23 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 7-8.34Walsh v. Selover, Bates & Co., (1909) 109 Minn. 136, 123 N. W.
291.
35(1912) 226 U. S. 112, 33 Sup. Ct. 69, 57 L. Ed. 146.36(1916) 242 U. S. 171, 37 Sup. Ct. 34, 61 L. Ed. 229.
37(1914) 29 N. D. 28, 149 N. W. 721.
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law to be the law properly applicable to such a situation, but Mr.
Justice Brandeis for the Court explained the earlier decision other-
wise. It meant, he said, that the question, what law was the applic-
able law, was not a federal question. 38 For this he cited cases that
hold that when the courts of state X are applying the law of
state Y to a fact situation, their construction of the law of state
Y, i.e., their finding as to what the law of state Y is, or means-
presents no federal question, though if the validity of a law of
state Y is in question, then the determination of that point by the
courts of state X does raise a federal question.3 9 The case of
Lloyd v. Matthews4" illustrates the point. An Ohio debtor in
Ohio gave one of his Ohio creditors a preferential conveyance of
certain Kentucky property; then he made a general Ohio irisolv-
ency assignment. In the Kentucky court the grantee and the
assignee in insolvency litigated the title to the Kentucky property.
.Holding, or assuming, that the validity of the conveyance as
against the assignment should be determined by Ohio law, the
Kentucky court gave judgment for the grantee, finding that Ohio
law would support the preferential conveyance. And a writ of
error taken in the United States Supreme Court was dismissed,
because the Kentucky decision, being merely a construction of
Ohio law, raised no federal question. But, the report notes, "Mr.
Justice Harlan was of opinion that the writ of error should be
retained and the judgment affirmed.""1 The Court, that is, held
that the Kentucky decision not only was final but would have been
final if it had held that Ohio law overthrew the conveyance in-
stead of supporting it, while Mr. Justice Harlan thought that
ought to be deemed a federal question, but that the Kentucky
court should be found to have rightly interpreted the Ohio law.
But suppose the Kentucky court had held that the validity of
the conveyance was to be determined according to (domestic)
Kentucky law, ignoring the law of Ohio? It will be seen that
while Kryger v. Wilson itself seems closely in point, the doctrine
on which Mr. Justice Brandeis relies does not squarely meet it.4
The question of the applicability of Ohio law to the operative facts
38(1916) 242 U. S. 171, 176, 37 Sup. Ct. 34, 61 L. Ed. 229.
39Cf. the cases cited at 242 U. S. 171, 176, 37 Sup. Ct. 34, 61 L.
Ed. 229. Cf. notes 83, 84, post.40(1894) 155 U, S. 222, 15 Sup. Ct. 70, 39 L. Ed. 128.
41(1894) 155 U. S. 228, 15 Sup. Ct. 92, 39 L. Ed. 130.
42Cf., however, notes 83, 84, post.
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is not the same as the question either of its validity or its mean-
ing (construction). In the Fox Case the question was not whether
the law of New York, or Illinois or Wisconsin, was valid. They
were all valid, within the proper scope of their operation. Neither
was the question one of construction. Just what the New York
rule was, was not in question, nor the meaning of the Illinois rule
or the Wisconsin rule." The question which of these three was
the law applicable in the Wisconsin court to the events that had
transpired, is a different question from the question either of valid-
ity or construction. But, starting with the proposition that the
rules of conflicts are mere matter of local law in each jurisdic-
tion,"4 it is urged, that since the only law a Wisconsin court can
apply, as law, is Wisconsin law, therefore the question, what law
a Wisconsin court shall apply to New York and Illinois events
and parties, is at bottom just a question of what rule Wisconsin
law prescribes as applicable to them; in other words, is merely a
question of construing the law of Wisconsin, which can raise no.
federal question. But while as between wholly independent coun-
tries the rules of conflicts are mere matter of local law in each
country for itself, that certainly is not entirely true as between
the individual American states. American lawyers are accustomed
to the treatment of at least two sorts of conflicts questions as
constitutional questions, to-wit: taxation, and the jurisdiction of
courts. 4 ' The latter rests squarely on the explicit words of the
full faith and credit clause" and until lately has been treated as
largely sui generis. But the clause includes "public acts" (which
must mean statutes at least) as well as "judicial proceedings";
hence it is now seen that the same full faith and credit that state
X must give to the judgments of state Y's courts, it must also give
to the statutes of state Y, 47-- in a proper case. This last qualifica-
4The question of the applicability of a statutory rule to a state
of facts is often a matter of the construction of the statute. Was it
meant to be applied to such facts as these? Cf., further, notes 55, 56,
post.
44Cf. note 33, ante.
45Pennoyer v. Neff, (1877) 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565; Goodrich
Conflict of Laws 64; Beale, Jurisdiction to Tax, (1919) 32 Harv. L.
Rev. 587; Dodd, The Power of the Supreme Court to Review State
Decisions in the Field of Conflict of Laws, (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev.
533-34.
4GIn its inter-state application. But an intra-state enforcement of
the identical rule is rested on the "due process clause" of the 14th
amendment, Pennoyer v. Neff, (1877) 95 U. S. 714, 24 'L. Ed. 565.
47Cf. Langmaid, The -Full Faith and Credit Required for Public
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tion is the constitutionally significant part of. the whole state-
ment.
Just as state X need not give faith and credit to whatever
state Y might choose to call a judgment, but only to such judgments
pronounced in state Y's courts as in the view of the United States
Supreme Court are based on proper (conflicts) principles of
jurisdiction; just so the courts of state X need not give faith and
credit to whatever statutes of state Y that state might choose to
say should control the situation, but only to those statutes of
state Y which the United States Supreme Court will deem prop-
erly applicable to" the litigation pending -in state X.
But this extension of the full faith and credit clause does not
quite come to grips with the problem presented by the Fo." Case.
In the Fox Case no statute of New York or Illinois appears in-
volved, to which the Wisconsin court could be thought obliged
to give faith and credit. The law of New York and Illinois as
apprehended by the Wisconsin court in the Fox Case seems to
have been simply the common law of those states, or as expounded
and understood in those states. So the answer to our initial in-
quiry may be made to turn upon this question: Was the Wisconsin
court in the Fox Case under any constitutional obligation to de-
termine the rights of the parties to that litigation according to the
common law of New York or Illinois? The conflicts problem, be
it noted, is the same whether the foreign law under considera-
tion be statute law or common law. The problem before the Wis-
consin court was: Ought the -rights of the parties to this litigation
to be controlled by the law of New York, or of Illinois, or of Wis-
consin? Apart from its strictly constitutional aspects, that prob-
lem is the same whether the New York or Illinois law in question
-is the statutory or the judge-made law of those states. But the
Wisconsin court's constitutional liberty of choice may conceivably
depend upon just that difference. It would seem difficult to read
the full faith and credit clause so as to impose any obligation to
give faith and credit to the common law of another state,48 and
Acts, (1929) 24 Ill. L. Rev. 383; Dodd, The Power of the Supreme
Court- to Review State Decisions in the Field of Conflict of Laws,(1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 533, 540 et seq.; Cook, The Powers of Con-
gress under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, (1919) 28 Yale L. J.
421, 432 et seq. Cf. notes .(1917) 26 Yale L. J. 405, 410-11; Field,
Judicial Notice of Public Acts under the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
(1928) 12 MxiNwsoTA LAw RErIw 439. Cf. note 5 ante.
48Cf. Dodd, The Power of the Supreme Court to Review State De-
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the clause can hardly be supposed to oblige a state to apply in
any litigation either the statutory or the judge-made law of a
foreign country.4" But how about the due process clause?
From this point of view the constitutional treatment of taxa-
tion is illuminating. Our national income-tax has been held applic-
able to the income realized from Mexican property (both real and
personal) by an American citizen resident in Mexico. 50  The
United States being a sovereign nation, there is no way to reverse
that decision. Indeed, again following Professor Cook,51 if our
Supreme Court held our federal income-tax applicable to the in-
come derived from Mexican land by a Mexican-born Mexican
citizen now and always domiciled in Mexico, that decision could
not be reversed either. And it might not be mere brutum fulmen;
in certain circumstances it might be made effective. But when
Kentucky undertook to apply its tax laws to property owned by
its own citizens but located in another state, the United States
Supreme Court forbade." Evidently, in this field Kentucky does
not stand as an independent country. It cannot "attach any con-
sequences whatever to any state of facts whatever.' ' 53 This de-
cision rests on the due process clause.5 4 But if a Kentucky deci-
sion holding its tax laws applicable to property outside Kentucky,
though owned by Kentucky citizens, deprived those citizens of
cisions in the Field of Conflict of Laws, (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 533, 545-47,
561-62; Beach, Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights (1918)
27 Yale L. J. 656, 664 et seq.; Field, Judicial Notice of Public Acts under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, (1928) 12 MINNESOTA LAW REVmw 439.
Quaere: Can the word "Records" in the full faith and credit clause be
made to mean that state X must (in a proper case) enforce the rules of
law enounced by the reported decisions of state Y? Or does the phrase
"Judicial proceedings" turn the principle stare decisis into an enforcible
constitutional obligation? Cf. note 71 post.49Cf. Hilton v. Guyot, (1895) 159 U. S. 113, 16 Sup. Ct. 139, 40 L.
Ed. 95; Pennoyer v. Neff, (1877) 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565.
5°Cook v. Tait, (1923) 265 U. S. 47, 44 Sup. Ct. 444, 68 L. Ed. 895.51Cf. note 16 ante.
'
2Union Transit Co. v. Kentucky, (1905) 199 U. S. 194, 26 Sup. Ct. 36,
50 L. Ed. 150.
r3Cook, Recognition of "Massachusetts Rights" by New York Courts,(1918) 28 Yale L. J. 67, 69. Cf. notes 16 and 51 ante.
54It could hardly rest on the full faith and credit clause; there was
no pertinent foreign law, statutory or judge-made, to which Kentucky
could be thought obliged to give faith and credit. The question was not
whether the property was taxed by the foreign state where it was located;
the difficulty was the ("inherent") inapplicability of Kentucky's tax laws
to the property, whether it were taxed or exempted in the foreign juris-
diction. For a justification of the actual result of the case, but on different
grounds, cf. Beale, Jurisdiction to Tax, .(1919) 32 Harv. L. Rev. 587, 592.
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their property without due process of law, why did not the Wis-
consin decision holding its telegraph laws applicable to the New
York-Illinois telegram deprive the Telegraph Company of its
property without due process of law ?55 Tax laws affect the rights
of the citizen against his government; telegraph laws affect the
rights and obligations of citizens to each other. Can a constitu-
tional distinction be deduced from that difference? Can the force
of these taxation cases be limited to that field? Can a state's (con-
stitutional) legislative jurisdiction be different there from else-
where? So our first question might be restated once- more, as
follows: Could the (domestic) law of. Wisconsin be constitution-
ally applied to the New York-Illinois telegram ?
A striking early case is Crapo v. Kelly. 7 While a ship regis-
tered in a Massachusetts port was in the South Pacific Ocean her
Massachusetts owners became insolvent and under the Massa-
55It will be noted, that the Kentucky case involved no question of
statutory interpretation (,Cf. note 43 ante). The applicability of an Act
of Congress to a state of facts arising outside the United States is a matter
of statutory construction (Cf. Cook v..Tait, (1923) 265 U. S. 47, 44 Sup.
Ct. 444, 68 L. Ed. 895). With no constitutional limitation on the jurisdiction
of the United States in this respect, that jurisdiction is (in American
courts) whatever 'Congress declares it to be. But the Kentucky statute
was explicit, that Kentuckians should be taxed on all their personal prop-
erty "whether in or out of this state." There was no room for interpreta-
tion. The question was the final one, of Kentucky's legislative jurisdiction,-
a conflicts question, constitutionally considered (Cf. Goodrich, Conflict of
Laws 64, 117; American Law Institute Re-Statement of Conflicts No. 2,
secs. 43 et seq., 64, 65 et seq., & Commentaries). But is there in this
respect no constitutional limitation on the jurisdiction of the United
States government? Cook v. Tait, (1923) 265 U. S. 47, 44 Sup. Ct. 444,
68 L. Ed. 895, and Union Trust Co. v. Kentucky, (1905) 199 U. S. 194, 26
Sup. Ct. 36, 50 L. Ed. 150, involve plainly disparate constructions of the
phrase, "due process of law." Yet that phrase as it stands in the fifth
amendment, applying to the federal government, is identical with the same
phrase in the fourteenth amendment, applying to the states. The meaning
can hardly be different in the two places. If then it is no deprivation of
property without due process for the United States to tax income realized
abroad from foreign property, how can it be a deprivation of property
without due process for a state to do the same sort of thing? But this is
a digression.
56For its holding that telegraph companies cannot limit their liability
the Wisconsin court relied first on common-law doctrine; but the opinion
cites a Wisconsin statute, which the court construes to the same effect.
So the final purport of the decision is, that this Wisconsin statute, declaratory
of the state's common law, is to be applied in a Wisconsin court to a New
York-Illinois telegram. Quaere: Is that within the legislative jurisdiction
of the state,-even if the statute had explicitly provided that it should be
so applied, as the Kentucky tax statute did? Cf. note 55, ante.
57(1871) 45 N. Y. 86; (on writ of error) (1872) 16 Wall. (U.S.) 610,
21 L. Ed. 430.
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chusetts insolvency statutes a Massachusetts probate court ap-
pointed an assignee for the benefit of creditors. On the ship's
later arrival at New York,--directly from the high seas, without
having been in Massachusetts since the assignment-a New York
creditor of the insolvents attached her in New York court. Then
the attaching sheriff and the Massachusetts assignee in insolvency
litigated in New York state cQurts the right to possession of the
ship. Judgment for the sheriff by the state court of last resort
was reversed by the United States Supreme Court. Appointment
of the Massachusetts assignee for creditors had divested the in-
solvents' title to the ship and the New York court could not con-
stitutionally treat her as their property and attachable as such.
The ship on the ocean at the time of the assignment was
deemed part of the territory of Massachusetts and thus within
the operation of her laws and proceedings. The decision is rested
on the full faith and credit clause, and because an insolvency pro-
ceeding was pending in the Massachusetts court, the case looks
at first blush like a mere affirmation of New York's duty to give
full faith and credit to a Massachusetts judgment. But it cuts
deeper than that. The only Massachusetts judgment that had
been rendered was, that the .owners were insolvent and that their
property, so far as it was within the jurisdiction of Massachu-
setts, should be assigned for the benefit of their creditors. But
there appears no Massachusetts adjudication that this ship was
within the jurisdiction of Massachusetts at that time (even sup-
posing the Massachusetts court could thus conclude that question).
It does not appear that the New York creditor had ever been in
Massachusetts or in any way subjected himself to the jurisdiction
of that commonwealth or her courts. As Mr. Evarts, of couhsel,
pointed out arguendo, there certainly had been no Massachusetts
judgment binding on the creditor personally, nor in rem as to his
rights or interests in or against this ship. There appears no Mas-
sachusetts adjudication that this ship was part of the insolvents'
property or was embraced within the assignment. Obviously,
neither the assignment nor any Massachusetts judicial proceed-
ing could affect the title to this ship except on the theory that it
was within the scope of the operation of Massachusetts law con-
trolling the consequences of acts there done, and the decision pro-
ceeds on that ground explicitly. The basic question was the juris-.
diction of Massachusetts by her laws to say whether and how
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-events that happened in Massachusetts (the owners' insolvency,
and the assignment) should affect the title to this ship at sea.58
Mr. Justice Hunt for the Court repudiates the contention that
because of the federal admiralty jurisdiction this ship was not
within the jurisdiction of Massachusetts law. The constitutional
grant of exclusive admiralty jurisdiction to the federal govern-
ment, he says, has no bearifig on the substantive law. It estab-
lishes no rule of property. "This remains as it would have been
had no such authority been given to the United States court."
Hence, the "relation of Massachusetts to the Union" had no "ef-
fect upon the title to this vessel. It stands as if that state were an
independent sovereign state." 59 The vessel "was subject to the dis-
position made by the laws of Massachusetts."" And the dissent
of Field and Bradley, JJ., proceeds expressly on the ground that
it is fiction to say that the vessel on the ocean was part of the ter-
ritory of Massachusetts; hence that fiction is recognized abroad
only by "comity," and New York could be under no constitutional
obligation to apply Massachusetts law to this ship at sea. 61 Mr.
Justice Hunt's language sounds like a vindication of the sovereign
independence of Massachusetts. But what the decision really does
is to limit the independence of the state of New York. Had this
ship come into Liverpool instead of New York and been attached
in the British port, and had the House of Lords given the same
judgment that was given by the New York courts, that decision
would have stood and the attaching creditor would have got the
ship,-at least in England. If she ever returned to America, of
course American courts could ignore such a British decision and
hand the ship back to the Massachusetts assignee. These possi-
bilities are corollaries of true sovereign independence. But New
- York has not the freedom of Great Britain. In litigation before
the courts of New York they must not make a "mistaken applica-
tion of doctrines of the conflict of laws,' 62 by deciding that since
58Apparently it was conceded, that if the owners by their own voluntary
act had conveyed the ship at sea to the person whom the court actually
appointed their assignee, that conveyance would have been effective and
would have been respected of course by New York, (1872) 16 Wall. (U.S.)
622, 642-43, 21 L. Ed. 430. But since that had not happened, the question
was reduced to the one of the jurisdiction of Massachusetts to say that
her laws should control the effect of events generally that had happened in
that state, upon the title to the ship on the ocean. Cf. note 79, post.
59(1872) 16 Wall. (U.S.) 610, 624.
60(1872) 16 Wall. (U.S.) 610, 632. Italics, the author's.
61(1872) 16 Wall. (U.S.) 610, 642-44.
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the ship was not in Massachusetts waters therefore New York
need not apply Massachusetts law to determine the effect of acts
done in Massachusetts on the title to the ship. That is not "purely
a question of local common law,--with which this court is not
concerned.1 63 The decision directly defines the legislative jurisdic-
tion of Massachusetts and enforces New York's constitutional
duty to respect it as so defined.64
More equivocal are the later cases of Royal Arcanum v.
Green 6 and Modern Woodinen v. Mixer.66 These fraternal insur-
ance orders had beer incorporated respectively in Massachusetts
and Illinois. They had issued beneficiary certificates to certain
members whose beneficiaries sued on the certificates in New York
and Nebraska, respectively. Earlier Massachusetts and Illinois
cases had determined the legal effect of the charters and by-laws
of the respective orders. And held, that New York and Nebraska
must give full faith and credit to the charters and by-laws of the
respective orders, according to their legal effect as determined by
the earlier Massachusetts and Illinois decisions. In the Modern
Woodmen Case Mr. Justice Holmes for the Court declares that
membership in the order "must be governed by the law of the
state granting the incorporation. We need not consider what
other states may refuse to do, but ... they cannot attach to mem-
bership rights against the Company that are refused by the law
of the domicil" (incorporation) .67 That is just what the Wiscon-
sin court did in the Fox Case. It attached to the sending of a tele-
gram from New York to Illinois rights against the New York
telegraph company that were refused by the law of New York
and Illinois. Mr. Justice Holmes prefaces these remarks by not-
ing that this membership was "something more than a contract."6
But he says this, evidently not to imply that in dealing with a mere
6 2Per Brandeis, J., (1916) 242 U. S. 171, 176, 37 Sup. Ct. 34, 61 L. Ed.
229. Cf. note 38 ante.
63(1916) 242 U. S. 171, 176, 37 Sup. Ct. 34, 61 L. Ed. 229. Cf. note
38 ante.64Cf. accord: Green v. Van Buskirk, (1866) 5 Wall. (U.S.) 307, 18
L. Ed. 599, 7 Wall. (U.S.) 139, 19 L. Ed. 109. Cf. note 79, post.
65(1915) 237 U. S. 531, 35 Sup. Ct. 724, 59 L. Ed. 1089.
66(1924) 267 U. S. 544, 45 Sup. Ct. 389, 69 L Ed. 783.
67(1924) 267 U. S. 544, 551, 45 Sup. Ct. 389, 69 L. Ed. 783. The
distinction here drawn is the one emphasized at the beginning of this article;
cf. note 10 ante.68Modern Woodmen v. Mixer, (1924) 267 U. S. 544, 551, 45 Sup. Ct.
389, 69 L. Ed. 783.
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contract a state has unrestrained .freedom in selecting the applic-
able law, but to rebut the suggestion that because this particular
certificate had been issued in South Dakota, the law -of that state
was the law by which to determine the rights of the parties. Ne-
braska was not free to adjudge the rights of these parties accord-
ing to any law her courts might deem of controlling relevaftce,6 9
nor as though all the material facts had occurred in Nebraska by
the acts of Nebraskans. She was required to apply the law of
Illinois, not by "comity," but by constitutional obligation.
But this law of Illinois (and of Massachusetts, in the other
case) was not statutory. It is found by the United States Supreme
Court in the earlier Illinois and Massachusetts decisions, to which
these orders, respectively, had been party.7 q Mr. Justice Holmes
seems to cite the Illinois case merely as evidence of the law of
Illinois, under the principle of stare decisis, not as directly bind-
ing on the parties to the Nebraska litigation under the doctrine
of res judicata. But a forum, in determining what the common
law of another state is, need not be controlled by that other state's
judicial precedents, 7 1 though it is habitually so controlled (perhaps
only self-controlled,?) in matters of foreign statutory inter-
pretation. But the opinion in the Royal Arcanun Case, while it
too talks of the "law of Massachusetts" as necessarily having a
controlling applicability in New York courts, yet explicitly- says
that New York's constitutional duty is to give faith and credit to
the earlier Massachusetts judgment, intimating that in that ear-
lier litigation the order "was the representative of the members,"
so that it could "stand in judgment as to all members" as to the
issues involved.72 This treats the earlier Massachusetts judgment
as binding directly on the instant New York beneficiary, as res
6OCf. note 93 post.
70Steen v. Mod. Woodmen, (1921) 296 Ill. 104, 129 N. E. 546, Reynolds
v. Royal Arcanum, (1906) 192 Mass. 150, 78 N. E. 129. These decisions,
however, construed corporate charters, which have a statutory origin and
are doubtless "public acts" under the full faith and credit clause; cf.
Field, Judicial Notice of Public Acts under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, (1928) 12 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 439, 441.
72St. Nicholas Bank v. State Nat'l Bank, (1891) 128 N. Y. 26, 33,
27 N. E. 849, 851. (Cf. Forepaugh v. Delaware Co., (1889) 128 Pa. St.
217, 18 AUt. 503. But this latter case of course lays down no rule of con-
stitutional obligation). Unless, indeed, the full faith and credit clausd can
be stretched to cover the common law of the foreign state and also to turn
the principle of stare decisis- into a constitutionally enforcible obligation; cf.
note 48, ante.
72(1915) 237 U. S. 531, 545-6, 35 Sup. Ct. 724, 59 L. Ed. 1089.
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judicata.13 So these cases perhaps mean only that a state is con-
stitutionally required to give effect to the judgments of other
states, but not to their substantive law as such. 4
But no such complication clouds the import of the cases next
to be considered.7 5 In the Head and Dodge Cases the courts of
Missouri were forbidden to determine by Missouri law the rights
and obligations attaching to policy loan contracts that the United
States Supreme Court deemed to have been made and perform-
able in New York; and the Dunken decision held the courts of
Texas incompetent to determine according to Texas law the rights
of the parties under an insurance policy that had been mailed by
a company agent in Tennessee to the insured in Texas. To apply
Texas law to that policy was to deny full faith and credit to the
law of Tennessee, the properly applicable law. Just why the United
States Supreme Court considered the Tennessee and New York
laws, respectively, to be the properly applicable laws, is beside
the present point. The point is that the state courts of Texas
and Missouri were constrained in the matter of determining the
relevant law to apply to the facts; they were forbidden to treat
their own domestic law, the lex fori, as the controlling law, and
were required to apply the proper foreign law to the facts of
litigation before them.
And there had been no binding New York or Tennessee judg-
ments controlling the situation. It was purely the substantive law
of those states that must be applied by the Texas and Missouri
courts respectively. The Dunken decision appears to be rested on
the full faith and credit clause, though the report discloses only
the common law of Tennessee as thus binding in Texas.76 The
73Cf. Converse v. Hamilton, (1911) 224 U. S. 243, 32 Sup. Ct. 415,
56 L. Ed. 749; Marin v. Augedahl, (1917) 247 U. S. 142, 38 Sup. Ct. 452,
62 L. Ed. 1038; Hancock Nat'l Bank v. Farnum, (1900) 176 U. S. 640, 20
Sup. Ct. 506, 44 L. Ed. 619.
74Cf. Langmaid, The Full Faith and Credit Required for Public Acts,
(1929) 24 Ill. L. Rev. 383, 393-96, 398-99; Field, Judicial Notice of Public
Acts under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, (1928) 12 MINN~sorA LAW
REvmw 439, 444-6. It is not believed that such an interpretation can be
maintained of Crapo v. Kelly, (1872) 16 Wall. (U.S.) 610, 21 L. Ed.
430. (Note 57 ante for the reasons stated in the text).
75N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Head, (1914) 234 U. S. 149, 34 Sup. Ct. 879,
58 L. Ed. 1259; N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, (1917) 246 U. S. 357,
38 Sup. Ct. 337, 62 L. Ed. 772; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, (1924) 266
U. S. 389, 45 Sup. Ct. 12), 69 L Ed. 342. Cf. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Liebing, (1921) 259 U. S. 209, 42 Sup. Ct. 467, 66 L. Ed. 900.
76At one place in the opinion, Mr. Justice Sutherland refers to the
ruling of the court below, that "the Texas and not the Tennessee statute,
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Dodge decision assumes to rest on the due process clause. The
Head Case seems to have been brought to the United States Su-
preme Court by invoking the fourteenth amendment, but Mr.
Justice White's opinion seems finally to rely on the full faith and
credit clause. 7
Finally, we have the recent case of Home Insurance Co. v.
'Dick78 in which the United States Supreme Court required the
Texas courts to apply the law of Mexico and not the (substantive)
law of Texas, to Texas litigation. Since the foreign law involved
here was the law of another country, the decision rests squarely
on the due process clause and not on the full faith and credit
clause. But if Texas is thus constitutionally obliged (in a proper
case) to apply the law of a foreign country to Texas litigation,
the conclusion is inescapalle that it must likewise be obliged (in
a proper case) to apply the law of another state to Texas litiga-
tion, be the law of that other state the common law or the stat-
utes thereof. This case sets the capstone on the whole process
and, it is confidently submitted, in connection with the cases previ-
ously reviewed will be found inevitably to commit the United
States Supreme Court to the broad position that the question:
"By the law of what jurisdiction shall the rights and liabilities
of parties to given acts and events be determined?" is a federal
question generally speaking, under the due process clause, and
in many cases also under the full faith and credit clause. This
subjects to federal supervision the entire field of the legislative
jurisdiction of the states79 and opens the way for making the
rules of conflicts a body of true international law as between the
states of this country.
controls this contract" (1924) 266 U. S. 389, 394, 45 Sup. Ct. 129, 69 L.
Ed. 342.
77(1914) 234 U. S. 149, 157, 161, 34 Sup. Ct. 879, 58 L. Ed. 1259.
The report mentions also the "impairment of contracts" clause; cf. note
24, ante.
78(1930) 281 U. S. 397, 50 Sup. Ct. 338, 74 L. Ed. 296. Cf. notes
10, 24 ante.
ThThe term "legislative jurisdiction" is used here as in the American
Law Institute's Re-Statement of Conflicts, No. 2, secs, 64, 65 et seq. ;-i.e.,
the jurisdiction (right, or competence) of the state by its laws to control
the consequences of given events. The problem is the same whether "its
laws" are its statutes or its judge-made rules. In the Fox Case, for in-
stance, the legislative jurisdiction of Wisconsin (or the lack thereof) to
control by its laws the New York-Illinois telegram is the same whether the
pertinent law of Wisconsin is a statute or a rule of Wisconsin common
law. Cf. notes 43, 48, 54, 55, 56, 58, 64, 71, ante.
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The difficulties in the way of a frank adoption of this position
are not to be blinked.80 To enforce the "impairment of contracts"
clause effectively, the United States Supreme Court early realized
that it must decide for itself whether a contract had been made,
and what were its terms, and not take the state court's decision
as final on those points. 81 Just so, if the United States Supreme
Court proposes to tell the Texas court that it must apply Mexican
law, or Tennessee law, in Texas litigation, it will as a practical
matter have to be prepared to tell the Texas court authoritatively
what the pertinent law of Mexico, or of Tennessee, is. But that
means overruling Lloyd v. Matthews82 and the formidable line of
cases on which Mr. Justice Brandeis relied in Kryger v. Wilson83
not to mention the overruling of Kryger v. Wilson itself.8 4 But
if that is done it leads to the apparently anomalous situation that
the question: "What is the law of Tennessee?" will be a federal
question when it arises in Texas litigation, but will not be a fed-
eral question when it arises in Tennessee litigation. To make it a
federal question in the latter case would go the whole way with
Professor Schofield and the Australians.8 5 Yet the anomaly per-
haps is no greater than the one illustrated by Swift v. Tyson88
and Gelpcke v. Dubuque8 7  And will the law of Tennessee, that
Texas is to be required to apply, be the law of Tennessee as ex-
pounded by her own state courts, or the law of Tennessee as ex-
pounded by the federal courts where they have original jurisdic-
tion of the litigation?s8 The question suggests an opportunity for
8oIt is not meant to urge that federal review of state decisions in this
field must in all cases be matter of right, on writ of error, rather than by
certiorari; cf. Dodd, The Power of the Supreme Court to Review State
Decisions in the Field of Conflict of Laws, (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 533,
560-62.81New Orleans Co. v. Louisiana, (1888) 125 U. S. 18, 8 Sup. Ct. 741,
31 L. Ed. 607.
82(1894) 155 U. S. 222, 15 Sup. Ct. 70, 39 L. Ed. 128. Cf. note 40,
ante.83(1916) 242 U. S. 171, 37 Sup. Ct. 34, 61 L Ed. 229, cases cited at
p. 176. Cf. note 39, ante. Quaere, whether these cases have not already
been impliedly overruled; cf. Langmaid, The Full Faith and Credit Required
for Public Acts, (1929) 24 Ill. L. Rev. 383, 399-400.
84Cf. notes 36-38 ante; and note 91, post.
8r Cf. notes 26, 29, 30, ante.
80(1842) 16 Pet. (U.S.) 1, 18-19, 10 L. Ed. 865.
87(1863) 1 Wall. (U.S.) 175, 205, 207, 17 L. Ed. 520. Cf. Miller, J.,
dissent p. 207-11; Forepaugh v. Delaware Co., (1889) 128 Pa. St 217, 18
Atl. 503, note 71 ante.
8 8 Cf. Swift v. Tyson, (1842) 16 Pet. (U.S.) 1, 18-19, 10 L. Ed. 865;
Liverpool Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., (1889) 129 U. S. 397, 443, 9 Sup. Ct.
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the federal courts to make their view of the law of each state bind-'
ing throughout the country except in that state itself !
It has been suggested that the doctrine here contended for may
be applied only piece-meal, in cases involving only certain "types
of situation," or certain lines of business.6 9 That is undoubtedly
the way the present condition of the law on the point has devel-
oped. The Supreme Court entered this path more or less uncon-
sciously. But in face of the inevitable implications of the varied
line of decisions now outstanding, it is not believed that such a
position can much longer be maintained.90 It is more plausibly
suggested, that while in a clear case like the Fox Case Wisconsin
may constitutionally be disabled from applying Wisconsin law,
yet in a case where the conflicting rules of several jurisdictions
have some relevance, or connection with the operative facts, the
United States Supreme Court may well leave the forum free to
pick and choose, or to disregard all foreign law and apply its
own.91 Yet no support can be obtained for this suggestion, from
such actual ilecisions as the Head, Dodge and Dunken Cases,92
where the United States Supreme Court did its own picking and
choosing amongst the possibly relevant foreign laws, and required
the forum to apply the one that it determined to be the one prop-
erly controlling.9"
Of course, to sar that in the Fox Case the Wisconsin court
469, 32 L. Ed. 788. Cf. note 71 ante. Cf. Field, Judicial Notice of Public
Acts under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, (1928) 12 MINN.SoTA LAw
REviEw 439, 455 et seq.
89Cf. Field, Judicial Notice of Public Acts under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, (1928) 12 MINNESoTA LAW Rsmrw 439, 450, 451; Yntema,
The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws, (1928) 37 Yale L. J.
468, 482.
9oSeveral of the recent cases hereinbefore reviewed have dealt with
the "business of insurance"; but not all of them. But can insurance pos-
sibly be deemed sui generis for this purpose? Insurance though across
state lines is not even inter-state commerce, Paul v. Virginia, (1868) 8
Wall. (U.S.) 168, 19 L. Ed. 357. Cf. notes 54, 55, 56, 64 ante.91This suggestion might reconcile Kryger v. Wilson, (1916) 242 U. S.
171, 37 Sup. Ct. 34, 61 L. Ed. 229,. notes 36-38 ante with the other cases
that have been considered; cf. note 84 ante and notes 92, 93, 94, post; cf.
Dodd, The Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in the
Field of Conflict of Laws, (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 533, 542 et seq.92Cf. note 75 ante.
93Cf. especially, Brandeis, J., dissent in N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge,
(1918) 246 U. S. 357, 377, 379-82, 38 Sup. Ct. 337, 62 L. Ed. 772; Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, (1924) 266 U.. S. 389. Cf. Green v. N. W. Trust
Co., (1914) 128 Minn. 30, 150 N. W. 229; Patterson v. Wyman, (1919)
142 Minn. 70, 170 N. W. 928. Cf. accord, Stone, J., in Gilbert v. Fosston
Co., (1928) 174 Minn. 68, 72, 216 N. W. 778, 779. Cf. note 69 ante.
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ought constitutionally to have applied the New York and Illinois
law, and not Wisconsin law, would not answer the next obvious
question, whether it must apply the New York or the Illinois law,
if they had differed. That question, however, lies beyond the
scope of the present thesis. It may only be remarked that an
extremely flickering light is shed upon it by the United States
Supreme Court decisions to date. In certain parts of the field,
that court's decisions thus far rather contribute to the confusion
that prevails, than help to clarify it.04 But all that is another
story.
94 Notably in the field of contracts, cf. Am. Law Inst. Commentaries on
Conflict of Laws Restatement, No. 4, pp. 23, 24, 25; Hall v. Curdell, (1891)
142 U. S. 116, 12 Sup. Ct. 154, 35 L. Ed. 956; Scudder v. Union Nat'l Bank,
(1875) 91 U. S. 406, 23 L. Ed. 245; and of marriage and divorce, where
the unfortunate decision of Haddock v. Haddock, (1906) 201 U. S. 562, 26
Sup. Ct. 525, 50 L. Ed. 867 has legalized a considerable amount of inter-
state anarchy. In matters of pure tort the court's attitude seems pretty
well settled. Cf. Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., (1909) 213 U. S.
347, 29 Sup. Ct. 511, 53 L Ed. 826; Slater v. Mexican Nat'l Ry., (1904)
194 U. S. 120, 24 Sup. Ct. 581, 48 L. Ed. 900; Babcock v. No. Pac. Ry.,
(1894) 154 U. S. 190,.14 Sup. Ct. 978, 38 L. Ed. 958; Santa Fe Ry. v.
Sowers, (1909) 213 U. S. 55, 29 Sup. Ct. 397, 53 L. Ed. 695; Cuba Ry. v.
Crosby, (1912) 222 U. S. 473, 32 Sup. Ct. 132, 56 L. Ed. 274; Tennessee
Co. v. George, (1914) 233 U. S. 354, 34 Sup. Ct. 587, 58 L. Ed. 997;
Spokane Ry. v. Whitley, (1915) 237 U. S. 487, 35 Sup. Ct. 655, 59 L. Ed.
1060. It seems unlikely that in the Fox Case the Wisconsin court would
be held justified in applying Wisconsin law on the theory of Machado v.
Fontes, [1897] 2 Q. B. 231, 66 L. J. 542; cf. Goodrich, Conflict of Laws
190, treating the case as sounding in tort rather than in contract. Cf. note
2, ante. But the Fox Case itself illustrates that to determine whether a case
sounds in contract or in tort is often a problem; cf. Alabama Ry. Co. v.
Carroll, (1892) 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803, and the confusion in the decisions
under workmen's compensation acts; cf. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Co.
v. Arizona, (1927) 32 Ariz. 275, 257 Pac. 644; Smith, Sequel to Work-
men's Compensation Acts, (1914) 27 Harv. L. Rev. 235, 344; cf. accord,
Langmaid, The Full Faith and Credit Required for Public Acts, (1929)
24 Ill. L. Rev. 383, 406-07. Any constitutionat rule of jurisdiction over
title to chattels seems also uncertain, despite the apparent definiteness of
such cases as Crapo v. Kelly, (1872) 16 Wall. (U.S.) 610, 21 L. Ed. 430,
and Green v. Van Buskirk, (1866) 5 Wall. (U.S.) 307, 18 L. Ed. 599,
(1868) 7 Wall. (U.S.) 139, 19 L. Ed. 109. Cf. Edgerly v. Bush, (1880)
81 N. Y. 199; Union Sec. Co. v. Adams, (1925) 33 Wyo. 45, 236 Pac. 513.
The American Law Institute Re-Statement of Conflict of Laws No. 2, sec.
52, states that there is "no authority against" the rule there enounced; but
Union Sec. Co. v. Adams, (1925) 33 Wyo. 45, 236 Pac. 513, seems in-
consistent in principle.
